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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) 
Respondent, 
vs. 
DAVID WAYNE BANFORD, ) 
Defendant and Appellant,) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
9395 
Appellant and four others were arrested on the 16th day 
of December, 1959, (R. 4, 5 ); a warrant for their arrest 
was issued pursuant to a complaint filed on the 18th of 
December (R. 2, 3, 5) and charging the second degree 
burglary of a service station. Defendants waived prelimi-
nary hearing on December 18 (R. 1, 2, 5 } and were bound 
over to the District Court on December 21 or before on the 
charge of second degree burglary (R. 5 ). 
Appellant David Banford and two others were arraigned 
on January 5, 1960 before the honorable Parley E. Nors eth 
(R. 10, 24-29). L. Roland Anderson, District Attorney for 
the Saeond Judicial District, appeared on behalf of the 
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State (R. 24). He was the only lawyer appearing (R. 24 ) . 
Because the arraignment was brief, and because it 
is the crux of this appeal, the arraignment is set forth, 
as it applied to appellant David Wayne Banford, in full. 
"THE COURT: No. 664 Criminal. State of Utah 
versus William Thomas Gary, Edwin Oscar Fillen, 
Charles Edson Sherwood, David Wayne Banford and 
Dennis Austin. This is the time set for arraignment. 
All of you come up, please (R. 24). 
"THE COURT: The record will show this is the 
time set for the arraignment of Edwin Oscar Fillen, 
David Wayne Banford and Dennis Austin. You may 
read the Information. Each of them have a copy, do 
they not, Mr. Anderson? 
MR. ANDERSON: Yes. 
THE COURT: The record will show each of them 
received a copy of the Information. 
(Information read by Clerk of the Court.)" (R. 25) 
"(The Court) Mr. ~avid Wayne Banford, if you 
are not designated in this Information by your true and 
correct name, you may declare your true name now, 
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or be prosecuted under the name of David Wayne 
Banford. 
MR. BANFORD: That's my name. 
THE COURT: The Court informs you that you are 
entitled to be represented by an attorney, and need 
take no affirmative steps until you have counsel. Is 
it your desire to have an attorney? 
MR. BANFORD: No sir. 
THE COURT: Do you waive services of an 
attorney in open court? 
MR. BANFORD: Yes s1r. 
THE COURT: The Court advises you that you may 
have and take at least 48 hours before you are re-
quired to plead to the Information charging you with 
burglary in the second degree, or you may waive that 
time and enter your plea now. 
MR . BANFORD: I waive it. 
THE COURT: The record will so show. 
To the Information charging you with bu·rglary in 
the second degree, what is your plea? Guilty or not 
guilty? 
-3-
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MR. BANFORD: Guilty, s1r. 
THE COURT: The record will show the defendant 
enters a plea of guilty, and upon such plea the Court 
adjudicates him guilty of the offense charged." (R. 26-27) 
THE COURT: I will refer it to the Adult Probation 
Department for investigation and report. And that 
means you three are to report to one of the probation 
officers in Ogden, Utah, today. 
MR. ANDERSON: This one man is incarcerated, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Then they can contact the man that 
1s in jail down here. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
THE COURT: Now I want to warn all of you that 
if you lie to Mr. Larsen, we'll know about it. If I 
find out that any one of you lied, you won't get any 
kind of probation consideration. I want to warn you 
now that I'm not granting you probation. I 4on't know 
whether I '11 give you probation or not. You have 
acted like a bunch of blamed fools. 
-4-
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(Further statement by the Court)"(R. 28-29) 
David Wayne Banford appeared before the honorable 
John F. Wahlquist for sentencing on January 19 (R. 12 ). 
He was not represented by counsel (R. 19), nor accom-
panied by counsel. (R. 7) stating that he was "accom-
panied by his attorney," was reformed on appellant's 
motion by the honorable John F. Wahlquist to read 
"without an attorney. "(R.14-16) David Wayne Banford 
was sentenced to serve an indeterminate term in the 
Utah State Penitentiary for second degree burglary 
(R. 7, 12, 19-22). The honorable John F. Wahlquist 
apparently felt that David Banford should serve the 
minimum one year sentence (R. 22). 
While the record does not disclose David Banford's 
age, the record does show that David is a minor, since 
the honorable John F. Wahlquist considered the ques-
tion of whether to commit David to the State Industrial 
School (R . 2 1 ) . 
David Banford arrived at the Utah State Peniten-
tiary on January 19, 1961 (R. 6-A). He filed a notice 
-5-
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of appeal on February 19 (R. 8-9 ). 
One last point causes counsel for the appellant some 
concern. On the one hand, this Court has established 
that it does not desire to hear recitations of fact not 
supported by the record. On the other hand, many 
appellate courts faced with pleas of guilty have felt 
that an important consideration was whether the de-
fendant was guilty. Counsel for the appellant are not 
aware of whether they should inform the court of 
matters outside the record. However, may we submit 
to this court that the defendant's plea of guilty is not 
conclusive proof that he is guilty. 
There is an unfortunate belief that if a man pleads 
guilty, he is guilty. This common presumption does 
not always meet the test of common sense. A defen-
dant may feel that unless he hires the most expensive 
lawyer he is merely postponing the inevitable. He 
may feel it is better to plead guilty and accept a 
criminal record and hope for probation, or a few 
months in jail, rather than place himself and his 
-6-
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family in debt to a lawyer. He may share the common 
belief that courts are "easier" on the defendant who 
pleads guilty. He may have been persuaded by the 
traditionally strong statements of police officers about 
how strong the State's case is. He may be a minor 
and unable to view the massive and overwhelming 
machinery of justice with a clear, mature view -- he 
just hasn't finished growing up. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING 
APPELLANT'S PLEA OF GUILTY AND ENTERING 
JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE THEREON FOR THE 
REASON THAT THE TRIAL COURT LOST ITS 
JURISDICTION OVER THE PROCESS. 
Counsel contends that David Banford did not 
receive that fundamental respect, that degree of 
fairness, which due process of law, both state and 
federal, require. Counsel offers five reasons for 
that conclusion. 
Before discussing the five reasons, counsel 
desires to discuss certain underlying questions of 
-7-
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law: Those points which West Publishing Company 
traditionally headnotes under "Appeal and Error", 
those points which a court reviews in determining 
what question is before it and what ruling may reason-
ably be made. First, the defendant can only present 
errors which are jurisdictional. He pled guilty and 
therefore waived all other errors, although this court 
has the power to determine that some happening was 
prejudicial error, even though not jurisdictional 
error. Second, since the errors are jurisdictional, 
they need not be preserved for appeal. Rather it is 
the trial court's (or the State's) duty to preserve a 
record showing that the trial court retained juris-
diction. Third, the want of juris diction in a criminal 
case may be raised for the first time in the Supreme 
Court. 
1. "The plea of guilty waives and defect not 
jurisdictional." 4 Wharton's Criminal Law and 
s 
Procedure, s 1901 (p. 770) (1957 ed. ); People v. 
Popescue, 345 Ill. 142, 177 N.E. 739, 77 A.L.R. 
-8-
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1199. Therefore, appellant is not concerned with 
whether the error of the trial court was prejudicial, 
nor with whether the trial judge abused his discretion. 
He has no right to raise such issues. On the other 
hand, if the trial court lost jurisdiction, the question 
does not arise whether the action was prejudicial. 
The trial court lost jurisdiction over the process, or, 
as some put it, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction. 
The process is therefore void. (Putting it another way, 
if the trial court didn't have jurisdiction to put David 
Banford in the State Penitentiary, then putting him 
in the State Penitentiary was prejudicial.) 
The cases cited in this brief are almost exclu-
sively cases wherein the accused pled guilty. It 
follows that the cases are ones wherein the court was 
concerned with jurisdiction. In those cases wherein 
a new trial was granted, the appellate court neces-
sarily found that the trial court lost jurisdiction over 
the process. Ore question before this court is whether 
errors which are jurisdictional in other states are 
jurisdictional in Utah. 
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2. Utah authority seems to support the proposition 
that if a trial judge fails to preserve sufficient record 
to show that he retained jurisdiction, then the Supreme 
Court will rule that he lost it. The trial judge faces 
no particular difficulty in preserving a record showing 
jurisdiction if, in fact, he had jurisdiction. On the 
other hand, placing upon a defendant not represented 
by a lawyer the duty to preserve a record showing 
that the trial judge did exceed his jurisdiction is placing 
upon a defendant an impossible burden. 
At least one function of the writ of certiorari in the 
State of Utah appears to be to give th.e Supreme Court an 
opportunity to review the record to see if the trial 
court has jurisdiction. Hillyard v. District Ct. of 
Cache County, 68 Utah 220, 249 Pac. 806 (1926). In 
that case, in which the Supreme Court found that the 
trial court exceeded its jurisdiction, there is some 
discussion of presumption of verity of the record on 
the point of whether the trial judge was obligated to 
preserve a record showing that necessary waivers 
-10-
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were made. Apparently the Court held that the record 
is conslusively presumed to contain all jurisdictional 
facts that did occur. The same rule appears to apply 
in the State of Illinois, at least in criminal cases. In 
that state, the writ of error appears to have the same 
function as the writ of certiorari in the State of Utah. 
Two cases from Illinois, relevant here, concern the 
need to amend the trial record in order to show that 
the jurisdictional acts did or did not occur. Both 
cases are concerned with the need to admonish a 
criminal defendant of the consequences of his plea 
before the plea of guilty may be accepted. In both 
cases, the Supreme Court of Illinois held, as a pre-
liminary ruling, that the record had to disclose that 
the defendant was admonished in order to show that 
the trial court retained jurisdiction over the process. 
Thefirst, Peoplev. Petrie, 294111.366, 128N.E. 
569, concerned a record which originally did not 
contain the statement that the defendant was duly ad-
monished of the consequences of his plea. The trial· 
-11-
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judge later amended the record. Held, reversed and 
remanded. The amendment was not duly made. With-
out the amendment, the record did not disclose the 
jurisdictional facts nee es sary for a finding that the 
court retained jurisdiction over the subject matter. 
In the second, People v. Fulimon, 308 Ill. 235, 
139 N. E. 396, the defendant moved to expunge from 
the record the statement that the defendant was duly 
admonished. Apparently, the motion was summarily 
denied. On appeal reversed and remanded. Without 
the correction, the defendant would have no case for 
review under a writ of error. 
On the basis of the foregoing authorities and 
reasoning, appellant submits that the presumption 
of verity of the trial record requires a finding that 
the trial record contains all jurisdictional facts 
which did in fact occur. The need for the rule s eerns 
apparent: a lawyer has to be able to rely upon a rule 
that says fb.e record discloses what happened. 
3. The question of want of jurisdiction in the 
-12-
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trial court, in a criminal case, may be raised for the 
first time in the Supreme Court. State v. Morrey, 23 
Utah 273, 64 Pac. 764. Therefore, David Banford 
was not obligated to point out to the trial court at what 
stage of the proceedings the trial court failed to inform 
David Banford of his rights. 
1. THE COURT COULD NOT ACCEPT DAVID 
BANFORD'S PLEA OF GUILTY BEFORE ADMONISHING 
HIM OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA BECAUSE 
HE WAS NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 
"Where the defendant is not represented by 
counsel, the court shall not accept a plea of guilty until 
it shall have explained to the defendant the consequences 
s 
of such plea. " s 7 7- 24- 6 U. C • A. ( 19 53). 
Appellant submits that the history of this statute 
emphasizes that a court commits jurisdictional, and 
therefore reversible, error if it fails to admonish the 
defendant of the consequences of his plea providing the 
defendant is not accompanied by counsel. 
-13-
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A. Summary 
In passing such a statute, the legislature exercised 
its prerogative to establish a policy binding upon the 
people and the courts. When a man appears without a 
lawyer before the bar of criminal justice, there is the 
danger that he has been misinformed by overzealous 
police officers or prosecutors as to what shall be the 
probable consequences of his plea. Perhaps he was 
informed, or believes though he was not informed, that 
a plea of guilty will automatically give him probation 
if he has not been convicted before. He may believe 
that the sentence is lower for those who plead guilty. 
He may not realize that the offense is punishable by 
imprisonment in the State Penitentiary. Perhaps, if 
he can prove that the plea of guilty arose from a 
promise of leniency, he can have the conviction and 
sentence set aside. However, the legislature has 
established that he bears no such burden of proof. 
The danger that his plea of guilty will arise from an 
1gnorance of the potential dangers he faces is 
-14-
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sufficiently great as compared with the ease with which 
that danger may be avoided, that the legislature has 
made a mandatory requirement: Before the Court may 
accept the plea of guilty, it must inform the defendant 
who appears without a lawye~ of the consequences of his 
plea. "Consequences" appears to mean the number 
of years which he can be forced to serve in the State 
Penitentiary for committing the offense. See any of 
the Illinois, Texas or Arizona decisions cited infra. 
Nor should it be the defendart' s duty to establish 
the prejudicial effect of the judge's action in failing to 
admonish the defendant of the consequences of his 
plea. That would place upon the defendant the burden 
of proof. If he cannot prove the fact of prejudice, then 
he loses regardless of whether he was in fact prejudiced 
or not. Compare, Frank, Courts~ Trial, wherein the 
honorable Jerome Frank discusses the difficulties of 
actually ascertaining what has happened. Therefore, 
the presumption must be one of prejudice. In order to 
put teeth in a law which is so easily followed and whose 
-15-
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violation may have such a profound effect on a defendant's 
subsequent life, that presumption must be irrebuttable. 
Since the presumption is irrebuttable, the error should 
be regarded as jurisdictional. Therefore, the judgment 
of guilty and the sentence entered thereon do not 
constitute due process within the meaning of the law. 
B. Legislative History 
The provision became part of the Utah law in 1935. 
s 
1935 Laws of Utah ch. 122, s 1. It was proposed by the 
Utah State Bar Association, V Utah Bar Bulletin 22-23, 
as part of a general change in Utah criminal procedure. 
See also IV Utah Bar Bulletin. It was based upon the 
A.L.I. Code of Criminal Procedure (1930). (The 
A.L.I. Code of Criminal Procedure (1930) is available 
at the University of Utah Law Library. } The relevant 
section of the A. L. I. Code is ~ 224. As found in the 
A.L.I. Code, and as proposed to the legislature, the 
statute would have contained the proviso that the "failure 
of the Court to explain the consequences of the plea shall 
not affect the validity of any proceeding in the action. " 
-16-
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The proviso presumably meant that the error could 
not be raised on certiorari or habeas corpus, since 
these remedies are limited to jurisdictional error. Ex 
Parte Hays, 15 Utah 77, 4 7 Pac. 612; Hillyard v. District 
CourtofCacheCounty, 68 Utah220, 249 Pac. 806. 
Apparently, then, a defendant would be able to raise 
the issue only on appeal and then would be required to 
show that the error was prejudicial. State v. Hines, 
6 Utah Zd 126, 307 P. 2d 88 7. That proviso was 
stricken before the law was adopted. See Utah Senate 
Bill #38 {1935), in the office of the Secretary of State, 
State of Utah, where the provision is stricken in red. 
This left the bill almost identical to the language found 
in the Illinois Rev. Stat., 1929, ch. 38, ~ 756, now 
Ill. Rev. Stat. {1959) Ch. 38 ~ 732, except that Illinois 
requires the admonishment even when the accused is 
accompanied by counsel. 
"In cases where the party pleads 'guilty' such plea 
shall not be entered until the court shall have fully 
explained to the accused the consequences of entering 
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such plea; ... " The statute is also almost identical, 
on this point, to the language of the Texas statute. See 
Vernon's Ann. C.C.P. Art. 501: 
"If the defendant plead guilty, he shall be admonished 
by the court of the consequences, and no such plea shall 
be received unless it plainly appear that he is sane, and 
is uninfluenced by any consideration of fear, by any 
persuasion or delusive hope of pardon prompting him 
to confess his guilt." (Amended in 1959 to add plea 
of nolo contendere. ) 
These two laws are among the five on which the 
American Law Institute relied in writing the proposed 
provision. A.L.I. Code of Criminal Procedure (1930) 
Commentary on section 224. They are also the two 
laws that appear to be most litigated and the two laws 
most similar in language. Accordingly, the court 
may desire to consider the interpretations of those 
statutes by courts of last resort. 
C. The Case Law. 
1. The Supreme Court of Illinois has clearly 
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stated its analysis in a 1957 case and has shown that 
the violation of the statute is reversible error in 
cases handed down before the Utah legislature adopted 
its act. 
In People v. Baxton, 10 Ill. 2d 295, 139 N.E. 2d 
754 {1957) {Daily, J. ), cert. denied, 77 S. Ct. 1062, 
353 U.S. 976, 1 L.ED. 2d 1138, judgment of guilty 
and sentence of 99 years to a plea of guilty to a charge 
of murder was affirmed. {Defendant had beat a man 
to death with a whiskey bottle.) 
"The next assignments of error center around the 
assertion in defendant's brief that the 'Court exceeded 
its jurisdiction by accepting Plea of Guilty from 
{illiterate) defendant who attempted to defend self.' 
Such a theory overlooks, of course, that the court 
set aside the proceedings at which defendant attempted 
to defend himself and ultimately accepted the plea of 
guilty entered while he was attended by counsel. In 
so doing we do not find either that the court exceeded 
its jurisdiction or that it committed an abuse of 
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discretion. A strict requirement of our law is that, 
in each conviction of a crime upon a plea of guilty, 
the record must show that before the entry of the 
plea the court fully explained its consequences to the 
defendant and that the explanation was understandingly 
received . ' Ill. R e v. Stat . 1 9 5 1 , c h. 3 8 , par . 7 3 2; 
People v. Washington, 5 Ill. 2d 58, 124 N.E. 2d 890. 
The object of the rule is to give the defendant the 
right to withdraw the plea of guilty, if, after hearing 
the consequences of such plea, he desires to be tried 
byajury. Peoplev. Wilke3 390111.598, 62N.E. 2d 
468. In the record before us the explanation and ad-
monition of the court, given upon two occasions, is a 
model of thoroughness, and th.e defendant's replies on 
both occasions demonstrate that his plea was know-
ingly and understandingly made and persisted in. We 
find no basis to now say that his plea should not have 
been accepted. " P. 756. 
In People v. Fulimon, 308 Ill. 235, 139 N.E. 396 
(1923) (Cartwright, J.), the defendant pled guilty to 
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the charge of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. 
In People v. Petrie, 294 Ill. 366, 128 N.E. 569 (1920) 
(Dunn, J. ) , the defendant pled guilty to an indictment 
charging abduction. Both of these cases were reversed 
and remanded because the Supreme Court of Illinois was 
not satisfied that the defendant was duly admonished. 
(The particular points of error in each of these cases 
are technical: on what notes may the trial judge rely 
when he makes a minute entry saying that the defendant 
was duly admonished. At least one of the opinions 
has a dissent which, however~ goes to the technical 
nature of the error: whether the Supreme Court of 
Illinois should rule that the record discloses that the 
defendant was admonished. All opinions are agreed 
on the point that if the record does not show that 
defendant was admonished, then he was entitled to a 
new trial.) 
In People v. Rusk, 348 Ill. 218, 180 N.E. 863 
(1932) (Dunn, J. ), the defendant was charged with 
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robbery while armed with a pistol. The State dropped 
the pistol count and the defendant pled guilty to robbery. 
After being duly admonished, he persisted in pleading 
guilty to robbery. Later in the same term, he was 
allowed to withdraw his plea to robbery. The State 
dropped the robbery charge and defendant pled guilty 
to a lesser included offense of grand larceny. He 
was sentenced to the state reformatory for an indeter-
minate sentence of one to ten years. On suit for writ 
of error, Held, reversed and remanded. The record 
failed to disclose that he was admonished of the conse-
quences of a plea of guilty to grand larceny. 
"This judgment must be reversed, nevertheless, 
because the record does not show that the court ex-
plained to the plaintiff in error the consequences of 
his plea of guilty to the charge of grand larceny. The 
record shows that, when the plea of guilty to the charge 
of robbery was entered, the court explained the con-
sequences of that plea, and afterwards accepted the 
plea and sentenced the plaintiff in error. Subsequently 
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the sentence was vacated, the plea withdrawn, and the 
state's attorney waived the robbery charge. The 
defendant's relation to the case was then the same as 
if he had never entered a plea. The sentence followed 
without explanation of the consequences of the plea. The 
record, containing no reference to any explanation to 
the defendant of the consequences of h~s plea of guilty, 
was insufficient to sustain the judgment. People v. 
Petrie, 294 Ill. 366, 128 N.E. 569; Krolage v. People, 
2 2 4 Ill . 4 56 , 7 9 N • E. 57 0 , 8 Ann . Cas . 2 3 5 . '' P. 8 64 . 
Other Illinois cases are to the same effect. See 
i .. ~. Peoplev. Meyers, 397111.286, 73N.E. 2d288 
1947) (Wilson, J.) (The defendant was sentenced to 
from one to fourteen years. He was charged with two 
offenses, one carrying a maximum term of ten years, 
the other, of life. Though the record said that the 
defendant was duly admonished, the Supreme Court 
found error. The Court was unwilling to say that the 
defendant was duly admonished since the trial court did 
not appear to know what the consequences were. In 
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view of the fact that the original conviction had occurred 
sixteen years in the past, the Court ordered that the 
case be dismissed. There would be no useful purpose 
in ordering a new trial.) People v. Washington, 5 Ill. 
2d 58, 124 N.E. Zd 890 (1955) (Klingbiel, J.) (Though 
the common-law record reported that the defendant was 
admonished, the transcript showed that the admonish-
ment was unsatisfactory. Therefore, the case was 
reversed. Note, however, that the admonishment in 
that case was more complete than the one given David 
Banford.) People v. Cooper, 366 Ill. 113, 7 N.E. 2d 
882 (1937) (Wilson, J.) (Reversal of conviction on 
plea of guilty to misdemeanor of disorderly conduct 
at a primary election. ) 
2. The Court of Criminal Appeals 1s the court of 
last resort in criminal cases in Texas. Vernon's 
Ann. Tex. Canst. Art. 5 ~~ 3 and 5, and interpretative 
commentary following each section. In Texas, the 
prosecution must prove a prima facie case on certain 
crimes even if the defendant pleads guilty. Braggs v. 
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State, Cr. App. , 334 S. W. 2d 793. Further, the 
accused can't plead guilty to certain crimes unless 
he's accompanied by counsel. Ex parte Kelley, 161 
Cr.R. 330, 277 S. W. 2d 111 (1955) (Davidson, J.) 
Even so, the requirement that the court must admonish 
the defendant of the consequences of his plea before it 
may accept a plea of guilty is mandatory. For two 
examples, see Alexander v. State, 163 Cr.R. 53, 288 
S. W. 2d 779 ( 1956) (Belcher, Cms r. ) (plea of guilty 
to felony of driving while intoxicated) and Coleman v. 
State, 35 Cr. R. 404, 33 S. W. 1083 (1896) (Davidson, 
J.) sentence of death on plea of guilty to first degree 
murder, reversed, even though defendant was already 
serving life imprisonment on a plea of guilty to another 
first degree murder.) See, also, May v. State, 151 
Cr. R. 534, 209S.W. 2d606 (1948) (reversedon 
another point) (" . . . It is to be hoped that the trial 
judges will keep in mind the requirements of the 
statute in accepting pleas of guilty in felony cases II 
p. 607) Many other cases are found in the annotation 
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to Vernon's Texas C.C.P. Art. 501. 
3. OTHER STATES 
Other states having similar statutes have inter-
preted them as being mandatory if the statutes have 
been interpr.eted at all. 
New York has the law that a man loses his driver's 
license if he has three moving violations in eighteen 
months, but that a magistrate need inform a defendant 
of this consequence if he desires to plead guilty to a 
violation which will count as one of the three. In 
Hubbellv. MacDuff, 2N.Y. 2d563, 141 N.E. 2d897 
(1957) Fuld, J. ), the New York court of last resort 
held that if the driver was not duly admonished, then 
the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles must return his 
license. 
The Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure #182 is 
substantially identical to section 224 of the A.L.I. 
Code of Criminal Procedure (1930}. It therefore 
contains the proviso that the failure to admonish is 
not jurisdictional. While State v. Smith 66 Ariz. 376 
-26-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
189 P. 2d 205 (La Prade, J.) was reversed on other 
grounds, the court noted that the requirement to ad-
monish was in the code for a purpose. 
So far as counsel's research discloses, only two 
other states have similar provisions. Alaska's Rule 
of Criminal Procedure # 11 has not been judicially in-
s 
terpreted. Colorado Rev. Stat. (1953) s 39 -7-8 was 
ruled complied with the Glass v. People, 12 7 Colo. 
210,255 P. 2d 738 (1953: en bane) (Moore, J.). The 
defendant was duly informed of the consequence of his 
plea when the trial judge informed him that he may be 
sentenced to life, even though the statute required 
that he must be sentenced to life.) 
2. THE DEFENDANT COULD NOT VALIDLY 
WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL FOR THE REASON 
THAT HE WAS A MINOR AND THEREFORE NOT SUI 
JURIS. 
A. The law of Utah and certain other states sup-
ports the conclusion that there is a minimal age below 
which a person is not competent to defend himself in a 
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criminal case. 
There should be a minimal age below which the 
court should not allow a youngster to waive his right 
to counsel--an age below which a man's ability to 
fend for himself is sufficiently in doubt so that a court 
will require that the boy have a lawyer. That age is the 
age at which he becomes sui juris. 
Utah law seems to assume that such an age exists. 
In the case of State v. Penderville, 2 Utah 2d 281, 272 
P. 2d 195, the defendant appealed from the Honorable 
A. H. Ellett's dramatic ruling that nobody was compe-
tent to defend himself when charged with murder, and 
that, therefore, the court would appoint a lawyer to 
represent him whether he like it or not. In light of 
Article 1, section 12 of the Utah Constitution, which 
guarantees the right to defend in person or by coul).sel, 
this court ruled that the trial court's conclusive pre-
sumption, however valid it was in fact, was not valid in 
law. A man may defend himself, or, at least, may try, 
if he is "sui juris and not mentally competent." State 
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v. Penderville, 272 P. 2d 195, 199. 
Other courts have emphasized the same point. In 
State v. Thomlinson, (South Dakota: 1960) 100 N. W. 2d 
121, the court used the phrase, "If he is sui juris and 
mentally competent ... " In Dietz v. State, 149 Wis. 
46 2 , 13 6 N • W • 16 6 , Ann . Cas . 1 9 13 C , 7 3 2 ( 1 9 12) , the 
court noted the need for the defendant to be sui juris. In 
both of these cases, the defendant was sui juris; in both 
cases the defendant was over twenty-one. 
B. The determining age is twenty-one. 
The rule requiring counsel for minors appears to 
be an old one. In Regina v. Tanner et alios, 2 Lord 
Raymond 1284 (6 Queen Anne) (92 Eng. Reprints 342), 
the defendant pleaded not guilty to an information 
charing the misdemeanor of riot. Verdict for the 
Queen. A motion was made to set aside the verdict, 
first, because the defendant gave no authority to the 
attorney to appear for him; second, because he was an 
infant under 18 and ought to have appeared by a guardian. 
In denying the motion, the court noted that in cases 
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charging infants with riot, the custom of the Queen's 
office was to have the defendant appear by an attorney. 
Counsel submits that there is something significant in 
that custom, occurring as it does in a period when 
English courts denied the right to counsel to persons 
charged with felonies. 
In Kansas, where the point has been litigated; it 
1s jurisdictional error to fail to require counsel when 
a minor 1s accused of a felony if the minor does not 
have his own lawyer. Quoting from State v. Oberst, 
127 Kansas 412, 419, 273 Pac. 490, 494, " ... In 
the case before us the defendant was a seventeen-year-
old boy ... The one thing this youngster needed more 
than anything else before pleading guilty to such a·hor-
rifying accusation was consultation with and the advice 
of a good lawyer ... " Continuing, 127 Kansas at 
421, 2 73 Pac. at 494-5, " . . . it is suggested that 
there are many prisoners incarcerated in our penal 
institutions on pleas of guilty without advice of counsel. 
We doubt that, and would be sorry, indeed, if it were 
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true, particularly if they are seventeen-year-old lads, 
who, without legal advice pleaded guilty to a murder 1n 
the first degree. Certainly, we are not anxious to 
share the responsibility for such a lamentable situation. 
We are well assured that the common practice in 
the district courts of this state is not to accept a plea 
of guilty in any felony case, except on the well-considered 
advice of counsel for the prisoner, and some careful 
judges take other precautions to avoid miscarriage of 
justice which need not now be discussed." In Willey v. 
Hudspeth, 162 Kansas 516, 178 P. 2d 246 (1947) 
(Bartch, J.) the question was whether the trial court 
erred in accepting a seventeen-year-old boy's plea of 
guilty to burglary in the second degree and to grand 
larceny. Held, the trial court erred, even though the 
trial judge duly notified the defendant of his Constitu-
tional rights and that the court would appoint a lawyer 
for him if he had none. The trial court also explained 
the nature of the charge and explained the penalty to 
the defendant--a procedure not followed when David 
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Banford appeared before the trial court in this case. 
Quoting from page 248, ". . . in none of the cited 
cases and in none which our research has disclosed, 
has this court approved the practice of permitting a 
17-year-old boy to enter a plea of guilty to a felony 
without consulting with counsel ... " Further in the 
opinion, the court says, "When the petitioner, as a 
boy of only 17 years of age, stood before the court, 
under the laws of this state he could not have entered 
into a valid contract obligating himself; he could not 
have voted; he could not have married without the 
consent of a parent; he could not alone, without a 
guardian ad litem, or next friend, have been heard to 
say anything in the court room in a civil action which 
would have been binding. Should we say, in such cir-
cumstances, that about the only thing he could have 
done alone, with legal significance, was to have pleaded 
guilty to a felony in a court of law?" See also Dunfee 
v. Hudspeth, 162 Kan. 524, 178 P. 2d 1009 (1947) 
Harvey, C. J. ) {defendant was twenty when he pled 
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guilty; he was granted a new trial) and McCarty v. 
Hudspeth, 166 Kan. 476, 201, P. 2d 658 (1949) (Thiele, 
J.). See, also, Application of Gillette, (Okl. Cr.) 349 
P. 2d 769 (Brett, J.) (fifteen-year-old defendant could 
not waive counsel.) 
C. Therefore, David Banford should receive a 
new trial. 
David Banford is a minor, as 1s shown by the fact 
that the court considered sentencing him to reform 
school. Under the above authorities, he could not 
waive his right to counsel. Therefore, he should have 
a new trial at which he will have counsel. 
3. THE DEFENDANT COULD NOT VALIDLY 
WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL FOR THE REASON 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO EXPLAIN TO 
DEFENDANT THAT HE WAS ENTITLED TO COUNSEL 
EVEN THOUGH HE BE A PAUPER. 
The 1 egislature, in jts wisdom, has determined 
that a man accused of a felony may well be at a disad-
vantage because he is not acquainted with judicial 
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procedure sufficiently well to be able to defend himself 
or to evaluate his chances of showing the jury that 
there is a reasonable doubt. While it may be well and 
good to convict the guilty, it is equally important that 
the innocent have an expert to defend their rights. 
Accordingly, the laws of the State of Utah include ~ 77-
22-12 U.C.A. (1953): 
"If the defendant appears for arraignment without 
counsel, he must be informed by the court that it · 
is his right to have counsel before being arraigned, 
and must be asked whether he desires the aid of 
counsel. If he desires, but is unable to employ, counsel, 
the court must assign counsel to defend him." See, also, 
77-15-1, ibid. 
If a man is sui juris and otherwise competent, he 
may waive that right to counsel. State v. Penderville, 
supra. However, the presumption is against a compe-
tent waiver. Velky v. United States, 279 F. 2d 679; 
Smith v. United States, 238 F. 2d 925 (1956) (5th Cir.: 
Hutcheson, J.) See also People v. Kemp, 11 Cal. 
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R pt r . 3 6 1 , 3 59 P. 2d 9 13 ( S . C t . : en b anc ) (Peters , 
J.: 1961) (Trial judge properly denied the defendant's 
request to discharge counsel after ascertaining that, 
though the defendant understood the elements of the 
offense, he did not under stand judicial procedure 
sufficiently well to be competent to handle his own 
defense.) 
Before the waiver is competent, the defendant 
must be aware of the right he waives. Griffith V. 
Wray, 282 F. 2d 711 (applying the fourteenth amend-
ment of the Constitution of the United States). 
Therefore, the following cases inter alia have 
found error in a trial court's accepting a waiver of 
counsel because the trial court failed to make the 
defendant aware that he was entitled to counsel forma 
pauperis . Ex Parte Cannon, (Okl. Cr. : 196 0} 3 51 
P. 2d 756 (Brett, J.) ("A waiver of the constitutional 
right to the assistance of counsel is of no less moment 
to an accused who must decide whether to plead guilty 
than to an accused who stands trial." Court Syllabus 
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#2.) State v. Jameson (S.D.: 1958) 91 N. W. 2d 743 
(plea of guilty to two c aunts of molesting a minor child. 
New trial ordered following petition of habeas corpus. 
The trial court had said to the defendant, "You are 
in addition advised that you are entitled to be repre-
sented by an attorney at all stages of the case if you so 
desire***do you understand these rights?" The defen-
dant answered, "I believe I do so, Your Honor.") 
(Note that the language in that case is almost identical 
to the language David Banford heard in the court below.) 
Winn v. State, 232 Ind. 70, 111 N.E. 2d 653 (1953) 
(Charge: Inflicting injury with a dangerous weapon 
while in the commission of a robbery) (Court: "do you 
have an attorney?" Defendant: "No, Sir. " Court: 
"Do you want one?" Defendant: "No, Sir.") (The 
court found an unintelligent waiver because the trial 
court didn't say that the lawyer would be a public expense 
Under the above authorities, David Banford's waiver 
was incompetent because the trial judge failed to tell 
him that if he could not afford a lawyer the court would 
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appoint one. Therefore, David Banford is entitled to 
a new trial. 
4. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ASCERTAIN 
WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS IN FACT COMPETENT 
TO WAIVE COUNSEL. 
As noted in State v. Penderville, supra, the crimi-
nally accused may waive counsel if he is sui juris and 
otherwise competent. It follows that the trial court 
must not only ascertain whether the accused is sui 
juris but also whether he is mentally competent, be-
fore the court may allow the defendant to waive his 
right to counsel. 
Under the presumption against waiver of a con-
stitutional right to counsel, see~·.&· People v. Whitsitt, 
359 Mich. 656, 103 N. W. 2d 424 {1960) {Black, J.) 
and the Supreme Court decisions cited therein, a 
defendant can be found to have competently waived 
counsel only if the trial court makes a finding that the 
defendant is mentally competent to exercise the waiver. 
As implied in State v. Penderville, supra, and as held 
-37-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in People v. Kemp, supra, if the defendant is found to 
be incompetent to handle his own case, then the court 
must appoint a lawyer to defend him. (In this regard, 
see also the annotation to Vernon's Texas C. C. P. Art. 
501.) 
Admittedly, the above cases do not specifically 
state that the presumption against waiver necessitates 
a finding of fact that the defendant is competent to 
waive counsel before the trial court allows the waiver. 
Counsel submit for the consideration of this court 
that, since there is a presumption against competent 
waiver, it necessarily follows that this presumption 
is stronger than a presumption of proper exercise of 
judicial discretion if both presumptions are forced to 
rely upon a silent record. If the presumption that the 
trial court exercised its discretion is applied, then the 
presumption against a competent waiver becomes non-
existent. This is because the proof of a competent 
waiver will then necessarily be forced to rely upon 
some actual testimony or evidence. Since there is a 
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presumption against competent waiver, the appellant 
David Banford must necessarily be granted the benefit 
of that presumption. It therefore becomes necessary 
for the trial record to show some testimony or some 
questioning to rebut that presumption. Since the record 
fails to show any such testimony or questioning, it 
follows that the presumption is not rebutted. Therefore, 
the trial court erred in accepting the purported waiver. 
5. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO REQUIRE 
THAT DAVID BANFORD DISCUSS THE CASE WITH A 
LAWYER BEFORE HE WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEl 
Because a defendant does not know law, he needs 
the advice of someone who does. Only then can he 
understand exactly what his situation is. A judge 
cannot fulfill that role--anything the defendant says 
in open court can be held against him. The defendant 
can trust only a person who is bound to keep the com-
munication secret. Only a lawyer has the needed 
education plus the needed privilege. 
Once a defendant talks to a lawyer, he is aware 
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of what his problems and chances are. Only then can 
he make waivers with an appreciation of what he is 
waiving. 
Appreciating this, some courts have noted the 
advisability of requiring that a defendant discuss his 
case with a lawyer. See i.e. State v. Thomlinson 
(S.D. ) 1 0 0 N. W. 2d 121 . 
Some district judges 1n Utah require than an 
accused see a lawyer before he may plead or waive 
rights. Counsel understand that both the Honorable 
A. H. Ellett and the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson 
have such a ru1e. Counsel has heard that the rule is 
applied in almost all felony cases before the Third 
Judicial District. The rule is also the standard pro-
cedure in the trial courts of Kansas. Dunfee v. 
Hudspeth, supra, esp. the quotation from that case, 
supra. Such a plan appears to be successful. 
Because the rule is successful, and because the 
rule is reasonable in light of the established laws of 
due process, this court should rule that, in the absence 
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of a legislative enactment to the contrary, it appears 
that no defendant may waive his rights or plead guilty 
to a felony until the court has required that he see a 
lawyer. 
Such a r.ule fulfills the traditional concept of the 
development of common law- -that for each evil, 
there must be a remedy. While a legislature chooses 
the problems it desires to face, and resolves the 
questions which it desires to resolve, a court faces 
only the questions brought before it and it must resolve 
these questions. This difference in function as pere-
nially required that courts develop law on a case-by-
case basis. The judges determine that which appears 
reasonable. In the absence of a legislative deter-
mination to the contrary, that judicial opinion becomes 
the law. Thereby, the people gain a remedy for each 
evil. 
A judge, in establishing a rule, looks to the 
nature of people and the nature of the world in which 
we live. An excellent application of this type of 
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reasoning is found in Justice Tom Clark's opinion 
in Mapp v. Ohio,-- U.S.--, 81 S. Ct. 1684. The 
Court was concerned with the question of whether 
illegally obtained evidence may support a conviction 
in a state court. Justice Clark analyzed the consi-
derations on both sides and viewed the question of 
whether the federal exclusion rule had worked 
satisfactorily. Concluding that the value of the rule 
was great, and that it worked no undue hardship on 
federal enforcement agencies, he ruled for the Court 
that the exclusion rule was the law under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
The same style of reasoning applies here. A 
number of trial courts in Utah require that a defen-
dant talk to a lawyer before the defendant may waive 
counsel or plead. Apparently, many other trial 
judges throughout the land apply the same rule. 
The rule has worked no undue hardships. The value 
of the rule is that the young, the unintelligent, and 
the hang-dog defendants gain counselling from 
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trained advocates on their side. Since many people 
are not as mature, knowing, and sophisticated as one 
would wish, the rule has been a great aid to many 
people. Counsel submits that it should be a great aid 
to all. 
CONCLUSION 
David Banford was not granted those rights which 
are guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and guaranteed by the 
Constitution and laws of the State of Utah. Therefore, 
the trial court lost jurisdiction over the process. It 
follows that David Banford is entitled to a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Richard G. Daly 
Richard S. Shepherd 
Attorneys for Appellant 
1876 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City~ Utah 
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